In this paper we present simple but comprehensive combinatorial criteria for completeness of finite deterministic 2-party functions with respect to information-theoretic security. We give a general protocol construction for efficient and statistically secure reduction of oblivious transfer to any finite deterministic 2-party function that fulfills our criteria. For the resulting protocols we prove universal composability. Our results are tight in the sense that our criteria still are necessary for any finite deterministic 2-party function to allow for implementation of oblivious transfer with statistical privacy and correctness.
Introduction
Oblivious transfer in the sense of a trusted erasure channel (Rabin-OT) was introduced in [Rab81] and later in [Cré88] proven to be equivalent to 2 1 -OT, where a receiver Bob may learn only one of two bits sent by Alice. Oblivious transfer turned out to be complete in the sense that every secure multiparty computation can be implemented using OT [Kil88, GL91, CvdGT95, IPS08] . Thereby, enduring interest in OT arised in cryptography and for numerous primitives it has been investigated, whether they allow for implementation of OT. In our work we exhaustively treat this question for the class of "finite deterministic 2-party functions", sometimes also referred to as "crypto gates". Such primitives are characterized by some finite alphabetes Υ A , Υ B , Ω A , Ω B and some mappings f A ∈ Ω
, such that on input x ∈ Υ A from Alice and y ∈ Υ B from Bob the primitive outputs f A (x, y) to Alice and f B (x, y) to Bob.
Related work
In the literature one finds OT protocols for the bounded-classical-storage model [CCM98] and the bounded-quantum-storage model [DFR + 07] as well as noisy classical [CMW05, Wul09] and quantum channels [May95, May96] , the latter taking commitments for granted. Further, there are reductions of 2 1 -OT to weaker OT versions that leak additional information [CK90, DKS99, Wul07] and to Rabin-OT [Cré88] . OT-combiners implement OT from granted sets of OTs with faulty members [MPW07, HIKN08] . For reversing the direction of 2 1 -OT a protocol is known with optimal number of OT calls [WW06] . Relative to complexity assumptions all-or-nothing laws have been shown [BMM99, HNRR06, MPR10] , i.e. all non-trivial primitives are complete. Our work has several, nowadays folklore reduction techniques in common with all the aforementioned literature.
We unify and generalize the results of [Kil91, Kil00] , where completeness criteria for symmetric (i.e. both parties receive the same output) and asymmetric (i.e. only one party learns the function output) 2-party functions were provided with respect to information-theoretic security. We import a main argument for the necessity of our criteria from [Kil91] . Our sufficiency proof is independent from [Kil91, Kil00] , since our results are more general and we use a very strict notion of security.
There are also results regarding whether various symmetric 2-party functions can be reduced to each other [MPR09] and what can be implemented from scratch when there is only a passive adversary [Kus92, KMQR09] . A corollary of our work extends all these results to non-symmetric primitives; some results of [KMQR09] already build on an early manuscript of our work [KMQ08] .
Our contribution
We expose a wide class of complete finite deterministic 2-party functions that are essentially neither symmetric nor asymmetric and hence are not subject of statistical completeness criteria in the literature so far. Further, by surprisingly simple combinatorial criteria to the respective function tables we give a precise characterization of all finite deterministic 2-party functions that allow for statistically secure implementation of OT. We provide an efficient and universally composable protocol scheme for OT from any finite deterministic 2-party function fulfilling our criteria. Our results are tight, as the necessity of our criteria still holds when only correctness and privacy of the implemented OT are required.
As a remarkable corollary of our work all non-complete finite deterministic 2-party functions turn out symmetric. This strengthens several known results for non-complete symmetric 2-party functions [Kus92, MPR09, KMQR09] . • Upon receiving input (x, i) from Alice, verify that (x, i) ∈ Υ A ×N and that there is no recorded tuple (x, i, Alice); else ignore that input. Next, record (x, i, Alice) and send (processing, Alice, i) to the adversary.
• Upon receiving input (y, i) from Bob, verify that (y, i) ∈ Υ B × N and that there is no recorded tuple (ỹ, i, Bob); else ignore that input. Next, record (y, i, Bob) and send (processing, Bob, i) to the adversary.
• Upon receiving a message (Delivery, Alice, i) from the adversary, verify that there are recorded tuples (x, i, Alice) and (y, i, Bob) and the former is not marked; else ignore that input. Next, mark the recorded tuple (x, i, Alice), compute a ← f A (x, y) and output (a, i) to Alice.
• Upon receiving a message (Delivery, Bob, i) from the adversary, verify that there are recorded tuples (x, i, Alice) and (y, i, Bob) and the latter is not marked; else ignore that input. Next, mark the recorded tuple (y, i, Bob), compute b ← f B (x, y) and output (b, i) to Bob.
When a party is corrupted, the adversary is granted unrestricted access to the channel between F
SFE and the corrupted party, including the ability of deleting and/or forging arbitrary messages.
Figure 1: The ideal functionality for secure evaluation of a 2-party function F . Adapted and simplified version of the Secure Function Evaluation functionality in [Can01] . Note that via the parameter i only the same multi-session ability is achieved as in [Can01] by multiple session IDs.
Organization of this paper
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we briefly present our results. Thereto, we first refer to the security notion that we use (Section 2.1), then introduce the notations needed for formulation of our results (Section 2.2) and, last but not least, state our completeness criteria in form of a Classification Theorem (Section 2.3). In Section 3 we give an intuitive exposition of how one can prove this theorem; a formal proof is located in Section 4. To make it self-contained, all definitions, lemmata, etc. from the rest of the paper are also restated in Section 4. In Section 5 we give a conclusion of our work and post some open questions that we find interesting to investigate.
Presentation of our results

Notion of security
We prove our classification results in the UC framework [Can01] with static corruption and statistical security, i.e. the adversarial entities A, S and the environment Z are computationally unbounded. Nonetheless, in our case the running time of a simulator S will always be polynomial in the running time of the according adversary A. Since we implement 2 1 -OT from given 2-party functions, in the real model there always is a hybrid functionality that provides access to the latter (see Figure 1 ). Since 2 1 -OT can be considered a special 2-party function that on input (b 0 , b 1 ) ∈ {0, 1} 2 from Alice and c ∈ {0, 1} from Bob outputs b c to Bob and a special "nothing" symbol ⊥ to Alice, we omit an explicit definition of the ideal functionality F OT . . We just interchanged the first two rows and applied an injective function to Alice's outputs in the third row.
Basic concepts
A finite deterministic 2-party function can be characterized by its input and output alphabets and output functions (q.v. Figure 1) . By F fin,det we denote the set of all tuples (Υ A , Υ B , Ω A , Ω B , f A , f B ), where Υ A , Υ B , Ω A , Ω B are non-empty finite alphabets and f A , f B are mappings from Υ A ×Υ B to Ω A and from Υ A × Υ B to Ω B respectively (cf. Notation 2 in Section 4.1.1). For convenience we will not always differentiate pedantically between the mathematical object F ∈ F fin,det and the corresponding primitive F
SFE , but from the context should be always clear what is meant. Our notion of F fin,det turns out a bit too detailed, since Alice and Bob can always relabel their input-output tuples of a given 2-party function without any side effects (q.v. Figure 2 ). There is no need for distinguishing between some F ∈ F fin,det and any relabelled version of F . By the following definition we can abstract from those irrelevant details (cf. Definition 33 in Section 4. Moreover, there may exist input symbols that are kind of "redundant" in the sense that an actively corrupted party can always input some corresponding "dominating" input symbols and at the same time perfectly simulate honest behaviour. This concept plays an important role in our proofs and results. We formally grasp it by the following definition (cf. Definition 3 in Section 4.1.1):
Definition (Redundancy). Let F := (Υ A , Υ B , Ω A , Ω B , f A , f B ) ∈ F fin,det . Then an input symbol y ∈ Υ B is redundant, if there exists some corresponding dominating input symbol y ∈ Υ B \{y }, such that the following two conditions hold:
1. For all x ∈ Υ A we have that f A (x, y) = f A (x, y ), i.e. from her own output Alice does never learn whether Bob did input y or y .
2. For all x, x ∈ Υ A with f B (x, y ) = f B (x , y ) we have that f B (x, y) = f B (x , y), i.e. by inputting y instead of y Bob gets exactly the same or strictly more information.
For input symbols x ∈ Υ A redundancy is defined analogously. If neither Υ A nor Υ B contains any redundant input symbols, F is called redundancy-free. W.l.o.g. actively corrupted parties always use dominating input symbols instead of the corresponding redundant ones. Also, there is no need to constrain what honest parties may learn. Therefore, in presence of an active adversary we can consider any 2-party functions equivalent when they only differ in some redundant input symbols (cf. Definition 36 in Section 4.5): Given any F ∈ F fin,det , one can show quite easily that all redundancy-freeF ,F ∈ [F ] are consistent renamings of each other, i.e. the redundancy-free version of F is unique up to consistent renaming.
Completeness criteria for all finite deterministic 2-party functions
With the definitions and notations from Section 2.2 we can now formulate our completeness criteria. Definition (Symmetric 2-party functions). Let F ∈ F fin,det . If F is a consistent renaming of some
A ×Υ 2 B is an OT-core of F , if the following three conditions are met (q.v. Figure 3 ): 1. We have that f A (x, y) = f A (x, y ).
2. We have that f B (x, y) = f B (x , y).
We have that f
Theorem (Classification theorem). For each F ∈ F fin,det it holds:
1. For the F (F ) SFE -hybrid model there exists an OT protocol that is statistically secure against passive adversaries, iff F has an OT-core.
If for the F (F )
SFE -hybrid model there does not exist any OT protocol that is statistically secure against passive adversaries, then F is symmetric.
For the F (F )
SFE -hybrid model there exists an OT protocol that is statistically secure against active adversaries, iff the redundancy-free version of F has an OT-core.
If for the F (F )
SFE -hybrid model there does not exist any OT protocol that is statistically secure against active adversaries, then the redundancy-free version of F is symmetric.
Note that, when there is an active adversary, only the third function in Figure 3 is complete on its own. The redundancy free versions of the other two functions just collapse to simple binary channels. This collapsing can be prevented, when there are additional input symbols. In Figure 4 one can see, how OT-cores can be complemented to redundancy-free 2-party functions of minimum size. For symmetric and asymmetric 2-party functions our completeness criteria coincide with the criteria from [Kil91, Kil00] . More concretely, we can directly translate the completeness criteria of [Kil91, Kil00] to our notations as follows.
[Kil91]: A symmetric 2-party function F is complete, iff it contains an OT-core. This holds true, regardless whether the adversary is active or passive.
[Kil00]: Given an active adversary, an asymmetric 2-party function F (with Bob being the receiver) is complete, iff for every input symbol y ∈ Υ B there exists some other input symbol y ∈ Υ B that is not dominated by y; in other words, F is complete, iff its redundancy-free version is non-trivial in the sense that both input alphabets have cardinality 2 or more. Given only a passive adversary, an asymmetric 2-party function F is complete, iff it has an OT-core.
However, our criteria are much more comprehensive than that of [Kil91, Kil00] , since ours also cover 2-party functions that are neither symmetric nor asymmetric. An illustrating example is the third function in Figure 4 , which is complete but not subject of the criteria in [Kil91, Kil00] .
How to prove the Classification Theorem
A fundamental tool in our proof strategy is the connection between presence of OT-cores and the question whether a 2-party function is symmetric (cf. Lemma 38 in Section 4.5):
Lemma (Symmetrization lemma). Each F ∈ F fin,det that does not have any OT-core is symmetric.
One way to proof this lemma can be sketched as follows. For
we can define an equivalence relation on (Υ A ×Ω A ) ∪ (Υ B ×Ω B ) induced as follows: For all x, x ∈ Υ A , a, a ∈ Ω A some simple induction yields the following implication (else F would have an OT-core):
Thereby, we cannot find any x ∈ Υ A , a, a ∈ Ω A with a = a and (x, a) ∼ (x, a ); the analog holds for y ∈ Υ A , b, b ∈ Ω A . Hence, via the mappings
we get a consistent renaming of F and this consistent renaming is obviously symmetric.
By the Symmetrization Lemma and some results in the literature we can already argue for the assertions 1 and 2 of our Classification Theorem. On the one hand, when F has no OT-core, F can be considered symmetric by our Symmetrization Lemma. However, in [Kil91] it has been shown that no reduction of OT to a symmetric 2-party function without OT-core can yield correctness and privacy at the same time, even if there is only a passive adversary-Alice can always exactly determine Bob's information about her inputs to the underlying 2-party function and vice versa.
On the other hand, when F has an OT-core and there is only a passive adversary, we can trivially implement one of the 2-party functions in Figure 3 . However, each of them can be transformed into a binary symmetric erasure channel (shown to be complete in [Cré88, CMW05] ) by the following protocol with expected 4 function calls. Alice first inputs a random bit b and then the inverse ¬b; Bob inputs independent random bits in both steps. The protocol is restarted until nowhere output "1" occurs. Afterwards Alice uses the last value of b as a one-time pad, which Bob knows with probability 1 2 . Once assertion 1 of the Classification Theorem is shown, assertion 2 follows by the Symmetrization Lemma. Analogously assertion 4 follows from assertion 3, so all we have to do is proving assertion 3. One direction, the necessity of OT-cores, already follows from the passive case. Proving sufficiency for the active case is much more challenging and can be seen as our main contribution.
Our overall strategy for reducing OT in presence of an active adversary to a finite deterministic 2-party function having an OT-core proceeds in two steps. First, Alice and Bob generate some amount of correlated data by repeated invocation of the 2-party function with randomized input. Within a subsequent test step each party has to partially unveil its data, so that significant cheating can be detected. Then, on top of the remaining data an invocation of OT is built. In Section 3.1 we examine what input distributions are adequate and how the test step has to be performed. In Section 3.2 we construct a protocol for OT from such correlated data and we examine its security.
Secure generation of correlated data
We start our examination with some negative example (see Figure 5 ), which shows that choosing an adequate input distribution is not trivial. In the first place, the example in Figure 5 shows that letting Alice and Bob use uniformly random input is not necessarily secure. In our example there would be an undetectable cheating strategy 2 for a corrupted Bob: He picks a uniformly random input symbol from {2, 3} instead of {0, 1, 2, 3} and after each invocation of the 2-party function with probability 1 2 locally relabels his input-output tuple by (2, 0) → (0, 0), (2, 1) → (0, 0), (2, 2) → (1, 1), (3, 0) → (1, 0), (3, 1) → (1, 0), (3, 2) → (0, 1). Thereby he can perfectly simulate honest behaviour, but at the same time does learn all of Alice's inputs to the 2-party function.
We circumvent this problem by more asymmetric input distributions: We pick an OT-core and let the corresponding input symbols be input with relatively high probability, while all other input symbols have a relatively low probability and are only needed for the test step. However, the example in Figure 5 also shows that we must choose the OT-core carefully. E.g. the OT-core in the upper left corner would be a bad choice, since the abovementioned cheating strategy can be adjusted to every protocol that assigns equal probability to Bob's input symbols "0" and "1". Still, significant cheating is possible for any input distribution with high probability for "0" and "1", as inputting "0" and "1" each once can be perfectly simulated by inputting "2" and "3" each once.
Actually, a main part of our work consists in proving that there always exists a "good" OTcore, if only the redundancy-free version of the considered 2-party function has any OT-core at all. In Figure 5 one "good" OT-core corresponds to inputs {0, 1} from Alice and {1, 2} from Bob: By occasionally inputting "2" Alice can check that Bob does not too often use other input symbols than {1, 2} (on input "2" she must not get output "0" too often) and that he does input "1" and "2" each with the right frequency (on input "1" she must get output "1" and "0" with according frequency), while Bob also sees Alice's actual input distribution (it is close to Bob's output distribution on input "2"). However, as the first function in Figure 4 shows, in general it will not suffice that the participants only pay attention to their own input-output distributions. Since in this example Alice's output always is "0", only by unveiling some random subset of his input-output tuples Bob can prove that he did use a prescribed input distribution; e.g. he will be caught cheating with high probability when he claims to have input "0" sufficiently often but can never distinguish whether Alice did input "0" or "2". Again, for a meaningful test it is necessary that Alice uses her complete input alphabet.
These examples motivate that always all input symbols should be used with some non-zero probability. In the following we first state our protocol for generation of correlated data (Section 3.1.1), then we introduce some algebraic structure that abstractly represents how a corrupted party can deviate from the protocol (Section 3.1.2) and finally we argue that there always is an OT-core that is "robust" against all such cheating strategies (Section 3.1.3).
The protocol for generating correlated data
A detailed description of the protocol with more concrete parameters can be found in Section 4.1.2 (Definition 12), it basically proceeds as follows.
1. Invocation of F : Alice and Bob call the underlying 2-party function F with randomized input for k times (k being the security parameter) and record their respective input-output tuples. A protocol parameter assigns what probability mass functions are to be used.
2. Control A: Alice challenges Bob on some polynomial subset of the recorded data, where he has to reveal his input-output tuples. Alice aborts the protocol if Bob obviously lies (i.e. his announcement is inconsistent with Alice's recorded input-output tuples) or his input distribution appears faulty. The test set is then removed from the recorded data.
3. Control B: This step equals the previous one with interchanged roles of Alice and Bob.
4. Output: Both parties announce where they have used input symbols that were only for test purposes. All corresponding elements are removed from the recorded input-output tuples by both parties. When too much of the recorded data has been deleted, the protocol is aborted; else each party outputs its remaining string of recorded input-output tuples.
We call this scheme offline protocol, since after the protocol step Invocation of F never again acces to F is needed. At this point we want to emphasize that although offline protocols are not completely symmetric in Alice and Bob, most of our arguments are-in fact solely in the proof of Lemma 17 in Section 4.2 we have to explicitely take care of this asymmetry. This convenient circumstance is predicated on the fact that a corrupted party only can get some polynomially small advantage by adversarial choice of the test set in protocol step Control A or Control B respectively. Our protocol for reduction of OT to correlated data is robust against such polynomially small advantages.
Algebraic idealization of cheating strategies
In this section we define and investigate a class of functions η : Υ A ×Υ 2 B → R ≥0 that characterize how a corrupted Bob may cheat in an offline protocol. For symmetry reasons our results will directly carry over to the case that Alice is corrupted. Our intuition is that η(x, y, y ) quantifies the relative frequency of events in protocol step Control A, where F was invoked with input (x, y), but Bob successfully claims that he did input y . We call such functions cheating situations. For convenience we use the notation η(X, Y, Y ) := x∈X,y∈Y,y ∈Y η(x, y, y ) for any X ⊆ Υ A , Y, Y ⊆ Υ B (cf. Notation 1 in Section 4.1.1). Also for convenience, we speak of a situation (x, y) F when we mean that F was called with input x from Alice and input y from Bob. We have the following six conditions to cheating situations (cf. Definition 7 in Section 4.1.1):
2. For all x ∈ Υ A it holds that η(x, Υ B , Υ B ) > 0, i.e. Alice did use her complete input alphabet.
For all
claimed input distribution appears independent of Alice's input distribution.
(a)
For all x ∈ Υ A , y, y ∈ Υ B with f A (x, y) = f A (x, y ) it holds that η(x, y, y ) = 0; else in the test step Control A Bob would be caught cheating immediately.
(b) For all x, x ∈ Υ A , y, y ∈ Υ B with f B (x, y) = f B (x , y) and f B (x, y ) = f B (x , y ) it holds that η(x, y, y ) = η(x , y, y ) = 0; else Bob would run an overwhelming risk of being caught cheating, since he cannot distinguish between situations (x, y) F and (x , y) F but must perfectly distinguish between these situations in the test step Control A.
Given some 2-party function F ∈ F fin,det , the set N F of all according cheating sitations has a very handy algebraic structure. On the one hand, cheating situations can be considered independent of (honest) Alice's input distribution, since they can be rescaled canonically to every input distribution that has non-zero probability for all x ∈ Υ A (cf. Also the abovementioned conditions 5a and 5b play a fundamental role in our proofs. Therefore we sum them up by an extra notation (cf. Notation 4 in Section 4.1.1):
F (x, y ) denote that the following two conditions are fulfilled:
The intuition behind that notation is that Bob can claim a situation (x, y) F to be a situation (x, y ) F , iff (x, y) F (x, y ). At least he cannot do so too often, if (x, y) F (x, y ). For all cheating situations η and all x ∈ Υ A , y, y ∈ Υ B with (x, y) F (x, y ) it holds that η(x, y, y ) = 0.
Note that the " F "-relation links cheating situations to redundancy matters, since an input symbol y ∈ Υ B is redundant, iff there exists some y ∈ Υ B \{y }, such that (x, y) F (x, y ) for all
x ∈ Υ A . In other words, the " F "-relation describes some kind of "local redundancy".
Given that Alice is uncorrupted, for every non-aborted run of an offline protocol with overwhelming probability there exists some cheating situation η, such that up to some polynomially small error the mappings (x, y) → η(x, Υ B , y) and (x, y) → η(x, y, Υ B ) describe the prescribed and the actual joint input distribution to the underlying 2-party function respectively (cf. Corollary 24 in Section 4.2.2). Thus we have to look for some kind of "robust" OT-cores (x,x ,ỹ,ỹ ), so that there does not exist any essentially non-trivial cheating situation η with η(Υ A , Υ B , {ỹ,ỹ }) = 1. Then in the protocol step Invocation of F even a corrupted Bob's input distribution has to be polynomially close to honest behaviour.
Existence of robust OT-cores
In this section we argue that whenever a redundancy-free 2-party function F ∈ F fin,det has any OTcore (x,x ,ỹ,ỹ ), then F also has an OT-core (x,x ,ȳ,ȳ ), such that for every cheating situation η with η(Υ A , Υ B , {ȳ,ȳ }) = 1 it holds that η(Υ A , Υ B , y) = η(Υ A , y, Υ B ) for all y ∈ Υ B . Intuitively, η(Υ A , Υ B , y) and η(Υ A , y, Υ B ) stand for Bob's claimed and actual input frequency of y respectively, i.e. we show that Bob practically cannot lie about his actual input distribution when he is demanded to use no other input symbols thanȳ,ȳ . Note that Alice's input symbolsx,x have stayed the same; hence in a second step we can analogously find an OT-core (x,x ,ȳ,ȳ ) that is also "robust" against all relevant cheating attempts of Alice and stays "robust" against a possibly malicious Bob.
Given an OT-core (x,x ,ỹ,ỹ ) of a redundancy-free 2-party function F ∈ F fin,det , we can find an OT-core with the desired "robustness" by just picking someȳ,ȳ ∈ Υ B , such that (x,x ,ȳ,ȳ ) is an OT-core and the following set has minimum size (q.v. Figure 6 ):
Intuitively spoken, within an offline protocol that assigns high input probability only toȳ,ȳ Bob cannot use any input symbol y ∈ Υ B \ Φ(ȳ,ȳ ) too often; at least for some specific x ∈ Υ A he practically cannot claim a situation (x, y) F to be (x,ȳ) F or (x,ȳ ) F without being caught cheating. In general it will not necessarily hold that Φ(ȳ,ȳ ) = {ȳ,ȳ }, nonetheless we can show now that the chosen OT-core (x,x ,ȳ,ȳ ) is "robust" in the abovementioned sense. So, let some arbitrary cheating situation η with η(Υ A , Υ B , {ȳ,ȳ }) = 1 be given. By the following eight steps we show that η(Υ A , Υ B , y) = η(Υ A , y, Υ B ) for all y ∈ Υ B (q.v. the proof of Lemma 29 in Section 4.3).
Since the "
F "-relation is transitive, we observe that Φ(y, y ) ⊆ Φ(ȳ,ȳ ) for all y, y ∈ Φ(ȳ,ȳ ).
2. We want to exploit the minimality of Φ(ȳ,ȳ ), but it yields that Φ(ȳ,ȳ ) ≤ Φ(y, y ) only in case that (x,x , y, y ) is an OT-core. However, note that f A (x,ȳ) = f A (x,ȳ ), since (x,x ,ȳ,ȳ ) is an OT-core. Further, for all y ∈ Φ(ȳ,ȳ ) by definition of Φ we have that (x, y)
Putting things together, we can conclude that f A (x, y) = f A (x, y ) for all y, y ∈ Φ(ȳ,ȳ ). Therefore, by the following construction we can split Φ(ȳ,ȳ ) into disjoint subsets Y, Y , such that (x,x , y, y ) actually is an OT-core for all y ∈ Y , y ∈ Y . We define (q.v. Figure 6 ):
Now, by the minimality of Φ(ȳ,ȳ ) and our observation in step 1 it follows that Φ(ȳ,ȳ ) = Φ(y, y ) for all y ∈ Y , y ∈ Y .
3. Now, for each (x,ŷ) ∈ Υ A ×Φ(ȳ,ȳ ) at least one of the following assertions must hold true:
Otherwise we had some
, what is a contradiction toŷ ∈ Φ(ȳ,ȳ ) = Φ(y, y ) (cf. the final sentence of step 2).
4. For everyŷ ∈ Φ(ȳ,ȳ ) \ {ȳ} we find some x ∈ Υ A , such that ∀y ∈ Y ∪ {ŷ} : (x, y )
This follows from step 3, F being redundancy-free and the transitivity of the " F "-relation.
Since F is redundancy-free, we find some x ∈ Υ A , such that (x,ŷ) F (x,ȳ). This not only is one part of the assertion above, but it also yields by step 3 that (x,ŷ)
sinceȳ ∈ Y by construction of Y . Now, if we could find any y ∈ Y with (x, y ) F (x,ȳ), in contradiction to our choice of x this would imply that (x,ŷ) F (x,ȳ), due to the transitivity of the " F "-relation.
For allŷ
Bob's claimed input frequency ofȳ cannot be greater than his actual overall input frequency of symbols in Y \{ŷ}.
Otherwise we could find someŷ
for all x ∈ Υ A (cf. the conditions 3 and 4 to cheating situations). However, by step 4 we can choose x such that Bob cannot claim any situation (x, y ) F with y ∈ Y ∪ {ŷ} to be a situation (x,ȳ) F ; the same holds for y ∈ Υ B \Φ(ȳ,ȳ ) by definition. He may do so only for situations (x, y ) F with y ∈ Y \{ŷ}, but these are too few, as η(
Bob's claimed input frequency ofȳ cannot be less than his actual overall input frequency of symbols in Y ∪ {ŷ }.
Since the assertion of step 3 is symmetric in Y and Y , analogously to step 4 for everŷ y ∈ Φ(ȳ,ȳ )\{ȳ } we find some x ∈ Υ A , such that ∀y ∈ Y ∪ {ŷ } : (x, y) F (x,ȳ ). We can use that to prove the analog of step 5:
. Moreover, we have that η(Υ A , Υ B , {ȳ,ȳ }) = 1 by assumption and that η(Υ A , Φ(ȳ,ȳ ), Υ B ) = 1 by step 6. Conclusively, for everyŷ ∈ Φ(ȳ,ȳ ) \ {ȳ } we get that
8. By combination of step 5 and step 7, for allŷ,ŷ ∈ Φ(ȳ,ȳ ) withŷ =ȳ andŷ =ȳ we can
. This can be exploited as follows. On the one hand, we can chooseŷ =ȳ , i.e. Y \{ŷ} = Y , whereby for allŷ
On the other hand, we can choosê
by assumption and neitherȳ norȳ is redundant, one can infer rather straightforwardly that η(Υ A , Υ B , y) = η(Υ A , y, Υ B ) for all y ∈ Υ B , as claimed.
Reduction of OT to correlated data
We now sketch a protocol that implements OT from the correlated data produced by an appropriate offline protocol. Within this sketch we also informally argue for the protocol's security. We refer to Section 4.4 for a detailed protocol description and formal security proofs. Given a redundancy-free 2-party function F that has some OT-core (x,x ,ỹ,ỹ ), the protocol proceeds as follows.
0. W.l.o.g. we may assume that the OT-core (x,x ,ỹ,ỹ ) is of the first or last type in Figure 3 ; else we interchange the roles of Alice and Bob. W.l.o.g. we also assume that Alice's and Bob's actual input and output symbols coincide with that of Figure 3 , i.e.x =ỹ = 0 and so on. Furthermore, w.l.o.g. we assume that (x,x ,ỹ,ỹ ) is a "robust" OT-core, for whose existence we have argued in Section 3.1.3.
1. Alice and Bob execute an offline protocol (as sketched in Section 3.1.1), where the probability mass functions n A and n B that stand for Alice's and Bob's prescribed input distribution respectively, are such that n A (0) ≈ 1 3 and n A (1) ≈ 2 3 and n B (0) ≈ n B (1) ≈ 1 2 . Note that in general these will not be the exact input probabilities, as for meaningful tests in the protocol steps Control A and Control B we still need all other inputs to be used with some polynomial frequency. However, for growing security parameter the relative frequency of the other inputs may polynomially converge to zero. Further note that even if a party is corrupted, its actual input distribution in non-aborted protocol runs must be polynomially close to honest behaviour, since (x,x ,ỹ,ỹ ) was chosen to be a "robust" OT-core.
2. We want to handle all possible types of OT-cores analogously, therefore we let Alice announce where she got output "1". All corresponding input-output tuples are deleted from the recorded data by both parties. When Alice tries to delete too little, Bob aborts the protocol. He also aborts the protocol when he has to delete some input output-tuple other than 1, f B (1, 1) . Since Alice cannot distinguish between situations (0, 0) F and (0, 1) F , this forces her to play honestly up to some polynomially small fraction of the recorded data.
3. Now most of the remaining input-output tuples belong to situations (0, 0)
Since all according outputs are "0", it suffices that Alice and Bob henceforth only keep track of their recorded input strings. Note that at this stage about one quarter of the remaining recorded data belongs to situations (0, 0) F , one quarter to (0, 1) F and one half to (1, 0) F .
4. Alice deletes some elements from her recorded input string, such that afterwards the string is balanced (i.e. it contains the same number of "0"s and "1"s). She annonces the corresponding indices to Bob, who deletes the according elements from his recorded data. If Alice tries to delete too much, Bob aborts the protocol.
5. Alice randomly permutes her recorded input string, such that afterwards each element at an odd possition is different from its subsequent element. She announces the permutation to Bob, who permutes his input string accordingly. Thereby their input strings become strings of pairs (each starting at an odd position), such that a pair "01" or "10" on Bob's side indicates the respective inverted pair "10" or "01" on Alice's side and a pair "00" on Bob's side gives him no information about the pair on Alice's side. If Bob finds a pair "11" (starting at an odd position), he aborts the protocol. Note that about half of Bob's pairs are "00", one quarter is "01" and one quarter is "10".
Further note that primarily there is only one way Alice may get some additional information about where Bob has "00"-pairs: She chooses the permutation adversarially, so that some "11"-pairs are produced on her side. However, since her input string is roughly balanced since the beginning of step 3, she must produce roughly as much "00"-pairs as "11"-pairs on her side and for each "00"-pair she is caught cheating by Bob with probability 1 2 . So even a corrupted Alice may know at most polynomially few positions where Bob has "00"-pairs.
6. Since Bob now can reconstruct about half of Alice's input string and Alice has only few information about where exactly Bob can do that, we can treat the recorded data like the result of Rabin-OT calls and adapt standard reduction techniques 3 . To that effect we rename Alices input string into a string of half length over the alphabet {0, 1} and accordingly for Bob over the alphabet {0, 1, ⊥}; in particular the renaming is "01" →"0", "10" →"1" on Alice's side and "10" →"0", "01" →"1", "00" →"⊥" on Bob's side. When a party cheated, we can represent that by a special symbol " " in that party's string. However, the symbol " " may occur only with some polynomial relative frequency, say less than k −γ . Let κ := k 1−γ .
7. Now, let b 0 , b 1 ∈ {0, 1} be Alice's 2 1 -OT input and let c ∈ {0, 1} be Bob's choice bit. Alice chooses two random bit stringsb 0 ,b 1 ∈ {0, 1} κ with
8. Alice and Bob respectively partition their recorded input strings into κ consecutive substrings of equal length l with l as large as possible; remaining elements are discarded. Lets
A denote Alices j-th substring ands 9. Alice outputs the nothing symbol "⊥" and Bob computes and outputs
Bob's output is correct, as by construction (cf. step 7) it holds:
We conclude this section with some remarks about how one can prove universal composability of this protocol, i.e. that it is simulatable in the ideal model (q.v. Section 4.4.3 and Section 4.4.4). Access to the underlying 2-party function F is in the ideal model only simulated, so the simulator can compute all thes
B respectively and hence extract the OT input of a corrupted Alice or Bob. Moreover, when Bob is corrupted, the simulator can fake a real protocol run that matches the ideal Alice's inputs b 0 , b 1 as follows: Just before step 8b is entered the κ-th time, the simulator inputs the extracted choice bit c into the ideal functionality F OT , thus learning b c , and then revises
Formal proof of the Classification Theorem
In this section we formally proof our Classification Theorem. We start with the basic definitions and notations needed for our proof (Section 4.1). Then (in Section 4.2) we show that cheating situations are a sufficiently accurate description of how a malicious party may influence the actual joint input distributions in an offline protocol. We exploit this (in Section 4.3) to show that any redundancy-free 2-party function F always has a "robust" OT-core, if only F has any OT-core at all. Then (in Section 4.4) we give a protocol for reduction of OT to 2-party functions that have such a "robust" OT-core and formally prove its security in the UC framework. Finally, we put things together, thus obtaining a formal proof for our Classification Theorem (Section 4.5).
Basic definitions & notations
In this section we just state the definitions and notations our formal proofs are based upon (Section 4.1.1); throughout the rest of the paper we will extensively use these concepts without explicitely referring to here each single time. We also give a detailed description of our protocol for generating correlated data from a given 2-party function (Section 4.1.2).
Algebraic & combinatorial notations
Notation 1 (Finite sums of function values). For any arbitrary set T with some finite subset S ⊆ T and any mapping g : T → R we set g(S) := ω∈S g(ω) for convenience. For functions with more arguments we use the canonical extension of this notation.
Notation 2 (Finite deterministic 2-party functions). Let F fin,det denote the set of all 6-tuples
Then an input symbol y ∈ Υ B is redundant, if there exists some corresponding dominating input symbol y ∈ Υ B \{y }, such that the following two conditions hold:
For input symbols x ∈ Υ A redundancy is defined analogously. If neither Υ A nor Υ B contains any redundant input symbols, F is called redundancy-free.
F (x , y ) denote that the following three conditions are fulfilled:
1. It holds that x = x .
It holds that f
∈ F fin,det the relation given by Notation 4 is a quasi-order over (Υ A ×Υ B ), i.e. it is transitive and reflexive.
for that hold the following five conditions:
5. For all x ∈ Υ A , y, y ∈ Υ B with (x, y) F (x, y ) we have that η(x, y, y ) = 0.
The mappings η ∈ N F are called cheating situations for
Then the set of all normalized cheating situations for F is a convex and bounded polytope in the linear space R Υ A ×Υ 2 B . Since this polytope can be described by finitely many linear inequations, it is the convex hull of a finite set of vertices.
Remark 9. Let F ∈ F fin,det and let η, η ∈ N F be normalized. Then for every s ∈ R the mapping η := s · η + (1 − s) · η is a normalized cheating situation for F , if only Image(η) ⊆ R ≥0 .
Offline protocols
In this section we formally state the protocol scheme by which we produce correlated data from some given 2-party function. However, before we do that, we formally introduce how we handle strings over finite alphabets.
Notation 10. Let s be a finite string over some alphabet Ω. By |s| we denote the length of s. By |s| α with α ∈ Ω we denote the number of appereances of α in s. We canonically extend this notation to subalphabets T ⊆ Ω by |s| T := α∈T |s| α . By s[i] with i ∈ {1, . . . , |s|} we denote the i-th element of s. For n ∈ N and a given index set K = {k 1 , . . . , k n } ⊂ N with 0 < k 1 < . . . < k n ≤ |s|, we denote the string
Further, for some given strings s A and s B of the same length |s A | = |s B |, we define the compound string s A ×s B , whose i-th element just is the tuple s
(n A , n B , α, β, γ), where n A : Υ A → R ≥0 and n B : Υ B → R ≥0 are some probability mass functions and α, β, γ ∈ R >0 , such that β < 1 2 .
Definition 12 (Offline protocols). Let
Further let (n A , n B , α, β, γ) ∈ Π F and letX := {x ∈ Υ A | n A (x) > 0} andỸ := {y ∈ Υ B | n B (y) > 0}. Let k denote the security parameter and let K := {1, . . . , k}. Then the offline protocol π F (n A , n B , α, β, γ) proceeds as follows: 0. Initialization: Alice initializes two empty strings s in A , s out A and an index set K A ← K. Bob analogously initializes s in B , s out B , K B . Let the probability mass functionsñ A ,ñ B be defined by: +β and sendsK A to Bob, who announces ŝ in
Alice aborts the protocol in the following two cases:
• Bob obviously lies, i.e. there exists some index i ∈K A with s out
• Bob's input distribution significantly differs from its expected value, i.e. there exist some X ⊆ Υ A , Y ⊆ Υ B with:
At the end of this protocol step Alice sets
3. Control B: This protocol step proceeds analogously to Control A with interchanged roles of Alice and Bob.
4. Output: Alice announces the set +β ∈ N, since w.l.o.g. we have that β ∈ Q and k ∈ {l ζ | l ∈ N} with ζ being some constant integer, such that ζ · (
Linking offline protocols to cheating situations
In this section we show that, given any 2-party function
given that Alice is honest, there always exists some cheating strategy η ∈ N F , such that the actual and the prescribed input distributions in the step Invocation of F of a corresponding offline protocol are polynomially close to the mappings (x, y) → η(x, y, Υ B ) and (x, y ) → η(x, Υ B , y ) respectively.
Blurred cheating situations
As mentioned above, cheating situations will characterize the actual and claimed input distributions in an offline protocol only up to some polynomial error. Therefore, in this section we define a class of functions that fulfill the conditions to cheating situations only up to some error parameter. Then we show that by these blurred cheating situations we can strictly bound a corrupted Bob's deviation from honest behaviour.
Definition 13 (Blurred cheating situations).
ε, δ ∈ R >0 letÑ F (ε, δ) denote the set of all mappings ν : Υ A ×Υ 2 B → R ≥0 that meet the following five conditions:
5. For all x ∈ Υ A , y, y ∈ Υ B with (x, y) F (x, y ) it holds that ν(x, y, y ) < ε.
∈ F fin,det and let π := π F (n A , n B , α, β, γ), such that (n A , n B , α, β, γ) ∈ Π F . Further let ε, ∆ ∈ R >0 . Let k denote the security parameter. Then by Λ A (π, ε, ∆) we denote the set 5 of all protocol runs of π that are aborted or for that it holds:
• For K := {1, . . . , k} and every X ⊆ Υ A , Y ⊆ Υ B we have:
• For all x ∈ Υ A , y, y ∈ Υ B with (x, y) F (x, y ) we have:
By Λ B (π, ε, ∆) we denote the set of all protocol runs that are aborted or for that it holds:
• For all x, x ∈ Υ A , y ∈ Υ B for that exists some y ∈ Υ A with f A (x, y) = f A (x, y ) and
We say that some predicate P holds for almost all (non-aborted) protocol runs in Λ A (π, ε, ∆), when there exists some constant k 0 ∈ N, such that P holds for all (non-aborted) protocol runs in Λ A (π, ε, ∆) with security parameter greater than k 0 ; analogously for Λ B (π, ε, ∆)
Lemma 15 (Stability of random distributions). Let (X k ) k∈N be some sequence of binomially and/or hypergeometrically distributed random variables X k , such that
Proof. Hoeffding's inequality (Theorem 2 in [Hoe63] ) implies that for all n ∈ N,c ∈ R >0 and every binomially distributed random variable X with P[0 ≤ X ≤ n] = 1 it holds:
In chapter 6 of [Hoe63] it was shown that this estimation also holds when X is distributed hypergeometrically. Thereby for all k ∈ N follows:
Corollary 16. Let H be some memoryless random source that samples from some finite alphabet and all S ⊆ Ω the probability P |X 1 . . .
Proof. For our proof we make A a bit more powerful: A always samples exactly k random symbols X 1 , . . . , X k r ← H and then computes and outputs N . Now, for n ∈ {1, . . . , k}, S ⊆ Ω let X n (S) := |X 1 . . . X n | S . Analogously to the proof of Lemma 15 for all n ∈ {0, . . . , k}, S ⊆ Ω it always holds:
Further, for n < k ∆ it trivially holds that P |X n (S) − n · p(S)| ≥ k ∆ = 0. Hence follows:
, such that α < ε and (2 − ∆)β < ∆ 2 and 1 2 < ∆. Then, when Alice is honest, a protocol run with fresh randomness for all parties lies in Λ A (π, ε, ∆) with overwhelming probability. Analogously, when Bob is honest, a protocol run with fresh randomness for all parties lies in Λ π B (π, ε, ∆) with overwhelming probability. Proof. When Alice is honest, then |s in A [K]| X with X ⊆ Υ A is a binomially distributed random variable with expected value k ·ñ A (X). Hence, by Lemma 15 only with negligible probability it may happen that |s in
only with negligible probability it may happen that |s in
Now, for the case that Alice is honest only inequation (6) is left, which is a bit harder to prove. Let x ∈ Υ A ,ỹ,ỹ ∈ Υ B , such that (x,ỹ) F (x,ỹ ). In case of f A (x,ỹ) = f A (x,ỹ ) we clearly have that
,ỹ,ỹ ) = 0 for every non-aborted run with honest Alice, since else Alice would have ignored an obvious lie of Bob in protocol step Control A. In case of f A (x,ỹ) = f A (x,ỹ ) we find somex ∈ Υ A with f B (x,ỹ) = f B (x ,ỹ) and f B (x,ỹ ) = f B (x ,ỹ ). On the one hand, Bob cannot distinguish situations where F was invoked with input (x,ỹ) from situations with input (x ,ỹ) better than by guessing. On the other hand, he has to answer according challenges in protocol step Control A differently, when he wants to simulate successfully that he did inputỹ instead ofỹ. Now we can adduce a simple hybrid argument. We could change the model as follows: Whenever Bob tries to simulate that he did inputỹ instead ofỹ and Alice's input to F wasx or x , we replace Alice's input by some fresh random symbol x ∈ {x,x } with P[x =x] =ñ
n A (x)+ñ A (x ) and update Alice's memory consistently. This does not change the distribution of protocol runs in any way. So, in case of s in
≥ k ε we can bound the probability p that Bob is not caught cheating as follows:
Moreover, by definition of π (Definition 12) we can estimate min x∈Υ A ñ A (x) > k −α |Υ A | , if only the security parameter k is great enough. Hence, for almost all security parameters k follows:
This is negligible, since α < ε by assumption. When Bob is honest, we can almost analogously prove that a protocol run with fresh randomness for all parties lies in Λ π B (π, ε, ∆) with overwhelming probability. Only inequation (8) is a bit more intricate to prove. Here, the random variable |s in
Nonetheless, by Lemma 15 for arbitrary but constant ∆ ∈ R with 1 2 < ∆ follows that only with negligible probability may happen:
Furthermore, when at least one party is honest, by definition of π (Definition 12) for every nonaborted protocol run it holds:
+β)∆ + 2k 2β may happen only with negligible probability. Finally, for almost all security parameters k we can estimate k
+β)∆ , since 2β < ( 1 2 + β)∆ by assumption and we can choose ∆ < ∆.
Further let ε, ∆, ω, ω ∈ R >0 and let α < ω < ( 1 2 + β)(1 − ∆) and ω < min( 1 4 , 1 − ∆) and ε ≤ 1 2 + β − ω. Then for almost all non-aborted runs in Λ A (π, ε, ∆) there exists some ν ∈Ñ F (k −ω , k −ω ), such that for all x ∈ Υ A , y, y ∈ Υ B it holds:
. First, let us check that ν ∈Ñ F (k −ω , k −ω ), i.e. ν fulfills the five conditions of Definition 13:
1. For all non-aborted runs in Λ A (π, ε, ∆) we have that ν(Υ A , Υ B , Υ B ) = 1 by construction.
By definition (Notation 14)
for all non-aborted runs in Λ A (π, ε, ∆) and all x ∈ Υ A it holds:
For almost all security parameters k we can estimate that from below by k −ω , since we have that α < ω < (
3. By definition (Notation 14) for all non-aborted runs in Λ A (π, ε, ∆) and all x ∈ Υ A , y ∈ Υ B it holds:
For almost all security parameters k we can estimate that from above by k −ω , since β < 1 2 by definition (Notation 11) and ∆ < 1 − ω by assumption.
for all non-aborted runs in Λ A (π, ε, ∆) and all x ∈ Υ A , y ∈ Υ B it holds:
For almost all security parameters k we can estimate that from above by k −ω , since ω < 1 4
by assumption.
for all non-aborted runs in Λ A (π, ε, ∆) and all x ∈ Υ A , y, y ∈ Υ B with (x, y) F (x, y ) it holds:
ν(x, y, y ) = k
So for all non-aborted protocol runs in Λ A (π, ε, ∆) it holds that ν ∈Ñ F (k −ω , k −ω ). Still there are two properties of ν left to be shown:
• By definition (Notation 14) for all non-aborted runs in Λ A (π, ε, ∆) and all x ∈ Υ A , y ∈ Υ B it holds:
From blurred cheating situations to non-blurred cheating situations
Now we show that every blurred cheating situation is sufficiently close to a non-blurred cheating situation, so that even a corrupted Bob's actual and prescribed input distributions in a nonaborted offline protocol will be polynomially close to the mappings (x, y) → η(x, y, Υ B ) and (x, y ) → η(x, Υ B , y ) respectively with overwhelming probability, where η is a (non-blurred) cheating situation for the underlying 2-party function.
Lemma 19 (Rescalability of cheating situations). Let F := (Υ
Proof. We just have to check the five conditions of Definition 7:
2. For all x ∈ Υ A we have thatη(x, Υ B , Υ B ) > 0, since τ (x) > 0 and η(x, Υ B , Υ B ) > 0.
3. For all x ∈ Υ A , y ∈ Υ B we have thatη(x, y,
, whereby especially followsη(Υ A , y, Υ B ) = η(Υ A , y, Υ B ). Hence we can conclude:
4. For all x ∈ Υ A , y ∈ Υ B we have thatη(x, Υ B , y ) = τ (x)·η(x, Υ B , Υ B )·η(Υ A , Υ B , y ), whereby especially followsη(Υ A , Υ B , y ) = η(Υ A , Υ B , y ). Hence we can conclude:
5. For all x ∈ Υ A , y, y ∈ Υ B with (x, y) F (x, y ) F we have thatη(x, y, y ) = 0, since η(x, y, y ) = 0.
Corollary 20 (Normalizability of cheating situations). Proof. We just have to check the five conditions of Definition 13:
By construction it holds thatν(Υ
3. For all x ∈ Υ A , y ∈ Υ B we have:
Hence we can conclude:
F (x, y ) it holds thatν(x, y, y ) = ν(x,y,y )
Lemma 22. Let m, n ∈ N, A ∈ R m×n , u ∈ R m , such that K := {x ∈ R n | Ax ≤ u} = ∅ (the less-or-equal relation is componentwise). Then for every norm on R n there exists some constant C ∈ R ≥0 , such that for all x ∈ R n it holds that min γ∈K x − γ ≤ C · min ε∈R m ,Ax≤u+ε ε . Proof. Since all norms on R n are equivalent, it suffices to give a proof for the L ∞ -norm. However, all our arguments and estimations in this proof hold for every L p -norm. For technical reasons we reformulate our Lemma, such that the original assertion is a direct corollary of the reformulation.
Let l, m, n ∈ N, A ∈ R m×n , u ∈ R m , B ∈ R l×n , v ∈ R l , such that for K := {x ∈ R n | Ax ≤ u} and V := {x ∈ R n | Bx = v} it holds that K ∩ V = ∅. We will show that there exists some C ∈ R ≥0 , such that for all x ∈ V it holds that min γ∈K∩V x − γ ≤ C · min ε∈R m ,Ax≤u+ε ε . Our proof is by induction on n − Rank(B). In case of Rank(B) = n our assertion is trivially true. So let us consider the case Rank(B) < n. Let a T 1 , . . . , a T m , b T 1 , . . . , b T l denote the rows of A and B respectively. W.l.o.g. we assume that a T 1 , . . . , a T m / ∈ Span(b T 1 , . . . , b T l ); else we could delete the according rows from A (and the according coefficients from u) without changing K ∩ V . For the same reason we may assume that for each i ∈ {1, . . . , m} there exists some x ∈ K ∩ V with a T i x = u i . When these assumptions yield an empty matrix A, again our assertion is trivially true. Now, for each i ∈ {1, . . . , m} we setṼ
So by induction hypothesis for each i ∈ {1, . . . , m} we find someC i ∈ R ≥0 , such that for all x ∈Ṽ i it holds:
Further, for each i ∈ {1, . . . , m} we find someẽ i ∈ Kernel(B) with a T iẽ i = 1, since by assumption we have that
Thereby, on the one hand for each x ∈ V \K we find some j ∈ {1, . . . , m} with a T j x > u j and we can setx := x − (a T j x − u j )ẽ j . This yields thatx ∈Ṽ j and hence we get:
On the other hand, for all x ∈ V ∩ K it holds that min γ∈K∩V x − γ ≤ C · min ε∈R m ,Ax≤u+ε ε , since min γ∈K∩V x − γ = 0.
Lemma 23 (Linear smoothness).
Then there exists some constant C ∈ R ≥0 , such that for all ε, δ ∈ R >0 , ν ∈Ñ F (ε, δ) there exists a cheating situation η ∈ N F with max x∈Υ A , y,y ∈Υ B ν(x, y, y ) − η(x, y, y ) < Cε δ . Proof. As stated in Remark 8, the set of all normalized cheating situations for F is a convex polytope in the linear space R Υ A ×Υ 2 B . So by Lemma 22 (instantiated with the L ∞ -norm) we find some constantC ∈ R ≥0 , such that for all γ ∈ R >0 ,ν ∈Ñ(γ, |Υ A | −1 ) there exists a normalized cheating situationη ∈ N F with ν(x, y, y ) −η(x, y, y ) <Cγ for all x ∈ Υ A , y, y ∈ Υ B .
. By Lemma 21 it holds thatν ∈Ñ(
. So, by our choice ofC we find some normalized cheating situationη ∈ N F with ν(x, y, y ) −η(x, y, y ) < 2Cε δ|Υ A | for all x ∈ Υ A , y, y ∈ Υ B . Now, we define the mapping η : Υ A × Υ 2 B → R ≥0 , (x, y, y ) → |Υ A | · ν(x, Υ B , Υ B ) ·η(x, y, y ). Note that η ∈ N F by Lemma 19, sinceη is normalized. Furthermore, for all x ∈ Υ A , y, y ∈ Υ B it follows:
Further let ε, ∆ ∈ R >0 and let α < min Then there exists some constant γ ∈ R >0 , such that for almost all non-aborted runs in Λ A (π, ε, ∆)
there exists some cheating situation η ∈ N F that for all x ∈ Υ A , y, y ∈ Υ B fulfills the following two conditions:
Proof. We find some constants ω, ω , γ ∈ R >0 , such that it holds:
Note that thereby ω < 1 − ∆, since β < 1 2 by definition (Notation 11). Hence, by Lemma 18 for almost all non-aborted runs in Λ A (π, ε, ∆) there exists some ν ∈Ñ F (k −ω , k −ω ), such that for all x ∈ Υ A , y, y ∈ Υ B it holds:
Note that by construction (Definition 12) we can estimate n A (x)·n B (y)−ñ A (x)·ñ B (y) ≤ 2k −α for all x ∈ Υ A , y ∈ Υ B . Furthermore, by Lemma 23 we find some constant C ∈ R ≥0 , such that for all security parameters k and all blurred cheating situations ν ∈Ñ F (k −ω , k −ω ) there exists a cheating situation η ∈ N F with max x∈Υ A , y,y ∈Υ B ν(x, y, y ) − η(x, y, y ) < Ck ω −ω . Hence, for almost all non-aborted runs in Λ A (π, ε, ∆) there exists some η ∈ N F , such that for all x ∈X, y, y ∈Ỹ it holds:
For great enough security parameter k we may estimate both left sides from above by k −γ , since we did choose γ < min(α, ω − ω ) right at the start of this proof.
OT-cores & robustness
In this section we restate the definition of OT-cores. Furthermore, we formally define what is meant by a robust OT-core and we show that every redundancy-free 2-party function actually has a robust OT-core, if only it has any OT-core at all.
Definition 25 (OT-cores). Let F := (Υ
is an OT-core of F , if the following three conditions are met: 1. We have that f A (x, y) = f A (x, y ).
3. We have that f A (x , y) = f A (x , y ) or f B (x, y ) = f B (x , y ) (or both).
Definition 26 (Robustness). Let F := (Υ A , Υ B , Ω A , Ω B , f A , f B ) ∈ F fin,det and let γ ∈ R. Further let π := π F (n A , n B , α, β, γ) with (n A , n B , α, β, γ) ∈ Π F . Then π is called γ -robust, if there exist some sets Γ A , Γ B of protocol runs of π with:
• If Alice is honest, then a protocol run with fresh randomness for all parties lies in Γ A with overwhelming probability and in all non-aborted runs in Γ A for all x ∈ Υ A , y ∈ Υ B it holds:
• If Bob is honest, then a protocol run with fresh randomness for all parties lies in Γ B with overwhelming probability and in all non-aborted runs in Γ B for all x ∈ Υ A , y ∈ Υ B it holds:
For convenience we just call a protocol robust, if it is γ -robust for any γ ∈ R >0 . An OT-core
B is called robust, if for all probability mass functions n A : Υ A → R and n B : Υ B → R with n A (x, x ) = n B (y, y ) = 1 there exist α, β, γ ∈ R >0 , such that β > 1 2 and the protocol π F (n A , n B , α, β, γ) is robust.
Notation 27 (Maskable inputs). Let
Given y 1 , . . . , y n ∈ Υ B , we write Φ F (y 1 , . . . , y n ) instead of Φ F ({y 1 , . . . , y n }) for convenience.
Then by the transitivity of the "
be an OT-core of F . Then there exist someȳ,ȳ ∈ Υ B , such that (x,x ,ȳ,ȳ ) also is an OT-core and every cheating situation η ∈ N F with η(Υ A , Υ B , {ȳ,ȳ }) = 1 is harmless (q.v. Definition 7).
Proof. We pickȳ,ȳ ∈ Υ B , such that (x,x ,ȳ,ȳ ) is an OT-core and the set Φ F (ȳ,ȳ ) is of minimal cardinality. Let η ∈ N F be some arbitrary cheating situation for F with η(Υ A , Υ B , {ȳ,ȳ }) = 1. We have to show that η is a harmless cheating situation, i.e. η(Υ A , Υ B , y) = η(Υ A , y, Υ B ) for all y ∈ Υ B (cf. Definition 7).
First we define some input sets Y, Y ⊆ Υ B that form a disjoint decomposition of Φ F (ȳ,ȳ ):
By the following eight observations we show now that η is a harmless cheating situation.
Observation 1: For all y ∈ Y , y ∈ Y we have that (x,x , y, y ) is an OT-core.
This can be shown as follows. Firstly, we have that f A (x,ȳ) = f A (x,ȳ ), since (x,x ,ȳ,ȳ ) is an OT-core (cf. condition 1 of Definition 25). Secondly, by definition (Notation 27) we have for each y ∈ Φ(ȳ,ȳ ) that (x, y)
, what in turn implies that f A (x, y) = f A (x,ȳ) or f A (x, y) = f A (x,ȳ ) (cf. condition 2 of Notation 4). Putting things together, we can conclude that f A (x, y) = f A (x, y ) for all y, y ∈ Φ F (ȳ,ȳ ). Now, by construction of Y and Y directly follows that (x,x , y, y ) is an OT-core for all y ∈ Y , y ∈ Y .
Observation 2: For each (x,ŷ) ∈ Υ A ×Φ F (ȳ,ȳ ) at least one of the following assertions holds true:
Otherwise we had some x ∈ Υ A ,ŷ ∈ Φ F (ȳ,ȳ ), y ∈ Y , y ∈ Y , such that (x,ŷ) F (x, y) and (x,ŷ) F (x, y ) and therebyŷ / ∈ Φ F (y, y ). However, by observation 1 we had that (x,x , y, y ) would be an OT-core and by Remark 28 and the minimality of Φ F (ȳ,ȳ ) would follow that Φ F (y, y ) = Φ F (ȳ,ȳ ). Now, we have a contradiction, asŷ ∈ Φ F (ȳ,ȳ ) \ Φ F (y, y ).
Observation 3: For allŷ ∈ Φ F (ȳ,ȳ ) withŷ =ȳ there exists some
This follows by observation 2 and F being redundancy-free. Letŷ ∈ Φ F (ȳ,ȳ ), such thatŷ =ȳ. Since F is redundancy-free, by Remark 6 we find some x ∈ Υ A with (x,ŷ) for all y ∈ Y . Now, if we could find some y ∈ Y with (x, y ) F (x,ȳ), by Remark 5 this would imply that (x,ŷ) F (x,ȳ) in direct contradiction to our choice of x. So, for all y ∈ Y it must hold that (x, y ) F (x,ȳ) and thus η(x, Y ,ȳ) = 0.
To prove this, we just have to combine that η(Υ A , Υ B , {ȳ,ȳ }) = 1 by assumption, i.e. η(Υ A , Υ B , Υ B \{ȳ,ȳ }) = 0, and that η(Υ A , Υ B \Φ F (ȳ,ȳ ), {ȳ,ȳ }) = 0 by construction of Φ F (cf. Notation 27 and condition 5 of Definition 7).
This can be shown as follows. Letŷ ∈ Φ F (ȳ,ȳ ), such thatŷ =ȳ. By observation 3 we find some x ∈ Υ A , such that η(x, Y ∪ {ŷ},ȳ) = 0. Further, note that η(x, Υ B \Φ F (ȳ,ȳ ),ȳ) = 0 by observation 4. Hence it holds:
By condition 3 and condition 4 of Definition 7 now follows the claimed inequality.
Observation 6: For allŷ ∈ Φ F (ȳ,ȳ ) withŷ =ȳ it holds that η(
The proof is mainly analogous to that of observation 5. Analogously to observation 3, for all y ∈ Φ F (ȳ,ȳ ) withŷ =ȳ there exists some x ∈ Υ A , such that η(x,ŷ ,ȳ) = η(x, Y,ȳ) = 0. Hence analogously to observation 5, for everyŷ ∈ Φ F (ȳ,ȳ ) withŷ =ȳ it holds that
. Now, since η(Υ A , Υ B , {ȳ,ȳ }) = 1 by assumption and η(Υ A , Φ F (ȳ,ȳ ), Υ B ) = 1 by observation 4, we can conclude:
Observation 7: We have that η(Υ A , {ȳ,ȳ }, {ȳ,ȳ }) = 1.
By observation 5 and observation 6 for allŷ,ŷ ∈ Φ F (ȳ,ȳ ) withŷ =ȳ andŷ =ȳ it holds:
On the one hand, we can chooseŷ =ȳ , i.e. Y \ {ŷ} = Y , whereby for allŷ ∈ Y \ {ȳ } it follows that η Υ A ,ŷ , Υ B ≤ 0. On the other hand, we can chooseŷ =ȳ, i.e. Y ∪ {ŷ } = Y , whereby for allŷ ∈ Y \ {ȳ} it follows that η Υ A ,ŷ, Υ B ≤ 0. Conclusively, we have that
, {ȳ,ȳ }) = 0 by observation 4. Finally, we get the claimed equality, as η(Υ A , {ȳ,ȳ }, {ȳ,ȳ }) can be written as follows:
Otherwise, since η(Υ A , y,
We have to show that neither can be true. For symmetry reasons it suffices to show impossibility of the latter; so let us assume that η(Υ A ,ȳ , Υ B ) > η(Υ A , Υ B ,ȳ ). By the conditions 3 and 4 of Definition 7 we can infer that η(x,ȳ , Υ B ) > η(x, Υ B ,ȳ ) for all x ∈ Υ A . Thereby, since η(Υ A , Υ B , Υ B \{ȳ,ȳ }) = η(Υ A , Υ B \{ȳ,ȳ }, Υ B ) = 0 by observation 7, we can conclude that η(x,ȳ , {ȳ,ȳ }) > η(x, {ȳ,ȳ },ȳ ) for all x ∈ Υ A , or equivalently that η(x,ȳ ,ȳ) > η(x,ȳ,ȳ ). By condition 5 of Definition 7, this especially implies that (x,ȳ )
what is a contradiction to F being redundancy-free (q.v. Remark 6).
As our only assumption to η was that η(Υ A , Υ B , {ȳ,ȳ }) = 1, observation 8 concludes the proof.
Lemma 30 (Quantizability of cheating situations).
Then there exists some constant δ F ∈ R >0 , such that for all η ∈ N F , γ ∈ R ≥0 with γ < 1 |Υ B | there exists some η ∈ N F that fulfills the following two conditions:
2. For all x ∈ Υ A , y, y ∈ Υ B we have that η(x, y, y ) − η (x, y, y ) ≤ 2γ · |Υ A ×Υ B |.
Proof. As stated in Remark 8, the set of all normalized cheating situations for F is the convex hull of a finte set of vertices, say {η 1 , . . . ,η n }. We define:
Now let some arbitrary η ∈ N F , γ ∈ R ≥0 with γ < 1 be given and letη denote the normalized version of η (cf. Corollary 20). We have to find some η ∈ N F that fulfills the conditions 1 and 2.
we assume that Y = ∅, as else we could just set η := η. Moreover, we find some a 1 , . . . , a n ∈ R ≥0 , such that n i=1 a i ·η i =η and especially n i=1 a i = 1. We set I := i ∈ {1, . . . , n} η i (Υ A , Υ B , Y ) > 0 , whereby we get:
|Υ B | by assumption, this especially yields that i∈I a i ≤ γ · |Y | < 1. So, we can set I := {1, . . . , n}\I andη := ( i∈Ī a i ) −1 · i∈Ī a i ·η i , whereby for all x ∈ Υ A , y, y ∈ Υ B we get:
Sinceη is normalized (cf. Remark 9), by Lemma 19 follows that η ∈ N F . Now we can put things together. On the one hand, by our choice ofη (q.v. Corollary 20) for every y ∈ Υ B with η(Υ A , Υ B , y ) ≤ γ · δ F it holds that y ∈ Y and hence η (Υ A , Υ B , y ) =η (Υ A , Υ B , y ) = 0 by construction. On the other hand, for all x ∈ Υ A , y, y ∈ Υ B we have:
that F is redundancy-free and has an OT-core. Then F also has a robust OT-core.
Further note that any quadruple (x, x , y, y ) ∈ Υ 2 A ×Υ 2 B is an OT-core of F , iff (y, y , x, x ) is an OT-core of F . By assumption we find somex,x ∈ Υ A ,ỹ,ỹ ∈ Υ B , such that (x,x ,ỹ,ỹ ) is an OT-core of F . By Lemma 29 we find someȳ,ȳ ∈ Υ B , such that (x,x ,ȳ,ȳ ) is an OT-core of F and every cheating situation η ∈ N F with η(Υ A , Υ B , {ȳ,ȳ }) = 1 is harmless. Again by Lemma 29 we find somex,x ∈ Υ A , such that (ȳ,ȳ ,x,x ) is an OT-core of F and every cheating situation η ∈ N F with η(Υ B , Υ A , {x,x }) = 1 is harmless. Now, let (n A , n B , α, β, γ) ∈ Π F , such that n A (Υ A \{x,x }) = n B (Υ B \{ȳ,ȳ }) = 0 and α < Further let ε, ∆ ∈ R >0 , such that ε < 1 2 + β − α and
and Γ A := Λ A (π, ε, ∆) and Γ B := Λ B (π, ε, ∆). By Corollary 24 we find some constant γ A ∈ R >0 , such that for almost all non-aborted runs in Γ A there exists some cheating situation η ∈ N F that for all x ∈ Υ A , y, y ∈ Υ B fulfills the following two conditions:
Moreover, by Lemma 30 we find some constant δ F ∈ R >0 , such that for all η ∈ N F and almost all security parameters k there exist some η ∈ N F that fulfills the following two conditions:
• For all x ∈ Υ A , y, y ∈ Υ B we have that η(x, y, y ) − η (x, y, y
Putting things together, for almost all non-aborted runs in Γ A there exists some cheating strategy η ∈ N F with η (Υ A , Υ B , Υ B \ {ȳ,ȳ }) = 0, i.e. η (Υ A , Υ B , {ȳ,ȳ }) = 1, and that for all x ∈ Υ A , y, y ∈ Υ B fulfills the following two conditions:
Since by our choice ofȳ,ȳ every cheating situation η ∈ N F with η(Υ A , Υ B , {ȳ,ȳ }) = 1 is harmless, i.e. η(Υ A , Υ B , y) = η(Υ A , y, Υ B ) for all y ∈ Υ B , we can conclude that in almost all non-aborted runs in Γ A for all x ∈ Υ A , y ∈ Υ B it holds:
For symmetry reasons 6 we anologously find some constant γ B ∈ R >0 , such that in almost all non-aborted runs in Γ B for all x ∈ Υ A , y ∈ Υ B it holds:
So we just can pick γ ∈ R >0 , such that γ < min(γ A , γ B ). Finally, by Lemma 17 we also have:
• If Alice is honest, then a protocol run of π with fresh randomness for all parties lies in Γ A with overwhelming probability.
• If Bob is honest, then a protocol run of π with fresh randomness for all parties lies in Γ B with overwhelming probability.
Conclusively, we just have to remove the protocol runs from Γ A and Γ B that have a too small security parameter; then Γ A and Γ B fulfill all requirements of Definition 26.
Building OT from appropriate 2-party functions
In this section we show how one can reduce OT to any 2-party function F ∈ F fin,det that has a robust OT-core (cf. Definition 26). We give a detailed protocol description in Section 4.4.1. Then we show that our protocol is a universally composable implementation of F OT . Thereto we separately show simulatability when no party is corrupted (Section 4.4.2), when the receiver Bob is corrupted (Section 4.4.3) and when the sender Alice is corrupted (Section 4.4.4). We omit an explicit proof of simulatability when both parties are corrupted, because this is trivial. 3. Alice and Bob locally rename the elements of s A and s B respectively by:
The reduction protocol
If afterwards |s A | = 0 or |s B | = 0, the corresponding party aborts the protocol. If afterwards the length of s A and s B is not an even number or Alice announced more than k ∆ indices, the protocol is aborted.
Alice deletes |s
5. Alice randomly permutes the elements of s A , such that afterwards for all i ∈ 1, . . . ,
. She announces the permutation to Bob, who permutes s B the same way. Bob aborts the protocol, if afterwards he finds some i ∈ 1, . . . , respectively, such that for all i ∈ {1, . . . , |s A |} it holds:
Furthermore, Alice partitionss A into κ := k 1−γ consecutive substringss 
to Alice, who aborts the protocol, if one of the first two conditions is violated. (b) Alice computesb
Alice outputs ⊥. Bob computes and outputs
Notation 32. Whenever at least one party follows the reduction protocol honestly, we can keep track of the state of s A ×s B during the protocol steps 1-5 as follows:
1. Let r 1 ∈ Υ * A and t 1 ∈ Υ * B denote the strings of input symbols that correspond to s A and s B respectively directly after step 1 of the reduction protocol. Although some party may be corrupted, r 1 ∈ Υ * A and t 1 ∈ Υ * B are well-defined by the invocations of F in the underlying offline protocol π.
2. Let r 2 and t 2 denote the strings that result from r 1 and t 1 respectively by applying the deletion announced by Alice in protocol step 2.
3. Given r 2 , t 2 of equal length, we define r 3 , t 3 ∈ {0, 1, } |r 2 ×t 2 | by:
4. Let r 4 and t 4 denote the strings that result from r 3 and t 3 respectively by applying the deletion announced by Alice in protocol step 4.
5. Let r 5 and t 5 denote the strings that result from r 4 and t 4 respectively by applying the permutation announced by Alice in protocol step 5.
Correctness of the protocol
It is not hard to verify, that the protocol from Section 4.4.1 does what it is supposed to do, as long as no party is corrupted. From Lemma 15 and our choice of the protocol parameters quite straightforwardly follows, that the protocol in a totally uncorrupted case is aborted only with negligible probability. It also is straightforward to see that an uncorrupted Bob does always output the correct value b c at the end of each non-aborted protocol run with an uncorrupted Alice:
Security against a corrupted receiver Bob
To prove security against a malicious Bob impersonated by some adversary A B , we have to construct a simulator S, such that the respective view of the environment Z in the ideal model is statistically indistinguishable from its view in the real model. Given A B , our simulator S works as follows. He internally simulates the real adversary A B and an honest Alice and provides them access to a simulated hybrid functionality F B like an honest Bob would have done. Wherever this is impossible due to dishonest behaviour of Bob/A B , he uses a special symbol " ".
2. The simulator choses a bit stringc ∈ {0, 1} κ , such that s
] ⊥ for all j ∈ {1, . . . , κ}.
The simulator computes
. On behalf of the corrupted Bob S sends the bit c to the ideal functionality F OT , receives (processing, Bob) from F OT , sends (Delivery, Bob) to F OT and finally receives some bit b from the ideal functionality F OT .
Now
Except for this revision the simulation just follows the programs of an honest Alice and A B . When the simulated Alice produces her regular output "⊥", the simulator sends (Delivery, Alice) to F OT . Now, we have to see why our simulator makes the ideal model indistinguishable from the real model. Since the underlying offline protocol π is γ -robust, by Definition 26 we find some set Γ A of protocol runs of π, such that if Alice is honest, a protocol run of π with fresh randomness for all parties lies in Γ A with overwhelming probability and in all non-aborted runs in Γ A for all x ∈ {x,x }, y ∈ {ȳ,ȳ } it holds:
So, w.l.o.g. we may condition our considerations to the event that in step 1 of the simulated reduction protocol a run λ of π is produced with λ ∈ Γ A . Under this condition we will show now that min j∈{1,...,κ} s − l ∆ may happen only with negligible probability. By construction, in every non-aborted simulation it holds that r 4 ×t 4 (0,0) ≥ r 1 ×t 1 (x,ȳ) − k ∆ and r 4 0 ≤ r 1 x . Further, since we conditioned our considerations to the event that in step 1 of the simulated reduction protocol a run λ of π is produced with λ ∈ Γ A , for all non-aborted simulations follows:
Hence, we can conclusively estimate:
Now, we can choose some arbitrary constant ε ∈ R >0 and estimate the bracket term by 1/6−ε 1/3+ε − ε for alomst all security parameters k. For ε small enough, this especially yields s 
Security against a corrupted sender Alice
To prove security against a malicious Alice impersonated by some adversary A A , we have to construct a simulator S, such that the respective view of the environment Z in the ideal model is statistically indistinguishable from its view in the real model. Given A A , our simulator S works as follows. He internally simulates the real adversary A A and an honest Bob and provides them access to a simulated hybrid functionality F (F ) SFE . The simulated Bob is given random input c ∈ {0, 1}, as soon as the ideal functionality F OT sent a message (processing, Bob). All messages from A A to Z and vice versa are just forwarded by S. When the simulated Bob outputs some bit b c , then by the following procedure S tries to compute b ¬c :
1. From the input and output of the simulated F (F ) SFE our simulator S for every j ∈ {1, . . . , κ} generates a strings
A like an honest Alice would have done. Wherever this is impossible due to dishonest behaviour of Alice/A A , he uses a special symbol " ".
2. He chooses some j ∈ {1, . . . , κ}, such thats
for all i ∈ {1, . . . , l}. If this is impossible, S aborts the simulation and terminates.
He computes
When S does not fail in his search for j , he finally sends (b 0 , b 1 ) on behalf of the corrupted Alice to F OT , receives (processing, Alice) from F OT and finally sends (Delivery, Bob) to F OT . Again, we have to show that our simulator makes the ideal model indistinguishable from the real model.
Proof. When the simulated Bob's random input c equals the input the ideal Bob got from the environment Z and the simultor does not fail in his search for j , the simulation is clearly perfect. Hence, any environment Z might distinguish between real and ideal model better than with success rate 1 2 , only if it could gather some information about c. However, when S is successful in his search for j , thenc[j ] and thereby also c are information-theoretically hidden from A A and Z.
Since the underlying offline protocol π is γ -robust, by Definition 26 we find some set Γ B of protocol runs of π, such that if Bob is honest then a protocol run of π with fresh randomness for all parties lies in Γ B with overwhelming probability and in all non-aborted runs in Γ B for all x ∈ {x,x }, y ∈ {ȳ,ȳ } it holds:
So, w.l.o.g. we may condition our considerations to the event that in step 1 of the simulated reduction protocol a run λ of π is produced with λ ∈ Γ B . Under this condition we will show now that the simulator S only with negligible probability fails in his search for j . Estimation of m * : By construction, for every non-aborted run of the simulated reduction protocol it holds:
Since Alice/A A cannot distinguish situations where F was invoked with input (x,ȳ) from situations with input (x,ȳ ), we can estimate her overall probability of not being caught cheating in step 2 of the reduction protocol by 2 −m . This holds due to the fact that for each i ∈K with
by a uniformly random symbol from {ȳ,ȳ } and update Bob's memory consistently without changing the distribution of protocol runs in any way. Hence, a non-aborted protocol run with m ≥ k 1−γ may happen only with negligible probability. Thereby, we can further estimate:
Furthermore, since we conditioned our considerations to the event that in step 1 of the simulated reduction protocol a run λ of π is produced with λ ∈ Γ B , we can conclude:
Thereby we have that m * < 11k 1−γ .
Estimation of m:
Since Alice/A A cannot distinguish situations where F was invoked with input (x,ȳ) from situations with input (x,ȳ ), we can estimate her overall probability of not being caught cheating in step 5 of the reduction protocol by (3/4) m . Hence, a non-aborted protocol run with m ≥ k 1−γ may happen only with negligible probability. The same way as in the estimation of m * , we can conclude that a non-aborted protocol run with r 1 [K] x =m ≥ k 1−γ may happen only with negligible probability. Thereby, we can further estimate:
2m < r 1 ×t 1 (x ,ȳ) − r 1 x + k ∆ + 14k 1−γ + k
1−γ
r 1 ×t 1 (x ,ȳ) − r 1 x < 3k −γ · r 1 ×t 1 < 3k
Thereby we have that m < (k ∆ + 17k 1−γ + k 1−γ )/2.
Putting things together, we get that m < (k ∆ + 41k 1−γ + k 1−γ )/2. Since 1 − γ > max(1 − γ , ∆) by construction of the reduction protocol, for almost all security parameters k we can estimate m < k 1−γ ≤ κ. Thus, S fails in his search for j only with negligible probability.
The classification theorem
In this section we restate our Classification Theorem (and all concepts that are needed for its formulation) and prove it formally, using all the results we precedingly showed in Section 4.
Definition 33 (Consistent renamings). Both equivalences can be shown analogously, so we just prove the first one. By construction it suffices to show the following implication for all x ∈ Υ A , y, y ∈ Υ B :
We give a proof by contradiction, so let us assume that we find somex ∈ Υ A ,ỹ,ỹ ∈ Υ B with f A (x,ỹ) = f A (x,ỹ ) and f B (x,ỹ) = f B (x,ỹ ), i.e. especially we find somex ∈ Υ A with:
x / ∈ f B (x,ỹ) ⇔x ∈ f B (x,ỹ )
By construction of f B follows:
So, either (x,x ,ỹ,ỹ ) or (x,x ,ỹ ,ỹ) is an OT-core of F , what contradicts our choice of F .
Theorem 39 (Classification theorem). For each F ∈ F fin,det it holds:
1. For the F (F ) SFE -hybrid model there exists an OT protocol that is statistically secure against passive adversaries, iff F has an OT-core. Proof. Instead of proving Theorem 39 directly, we prove the following five assertions, which as a whole imply Theorem 39. For all 2-party functions F ∈ F fin,det we show:
If for the F
1. When F does not have any OT-core, then F is symmetric.
2. When F is redundancy free and has an OT-core, then for the F Assertion 1 just is Lemma 38. Assertion 2 follows by Corollary 31 and the protocol and security proofs in Section 4.4. Assertion 3 can be shown analogously to the second one, since with respect to passive adversaries any OT-core can be considered "robust"-in fact it suffices when in step 1 of the reduction protocol even corrupted parties follow the underlying offline protocol π honestly. Assertion 4 is proven in [Kil91] , where only symmetric 2-party functions are considered and symmetric OT-cores are called "imbedded OR". Although another notion of security is used there, the arguments directly carry over. Finally, assertion 5 can be derived from the following easily verifyable facts:
• Instead of inputting a redundant input symbol into F
SFE one can always use a corresponding dominating input symbol and will get exactly the same or strictly more information.
• Replacing F by some consistent renaming corresponds to locally relabeling the input-output tuples of F
SFE by Alice and Bob.
Conclusion & open questions
In this paper we showed that there is a wide class of primitives that have not been covered by existing completeness criteria, namely all 2-party functions that are essentially neither symmetric nor asymmetric. We solved this open problem by presenting simple but comprehensive criteria that combinatorially classify all complete deterministic 2-party functions with finite input and output alphabets. We proved constructively that our criteria are sufficient in the UC framework, which is the most restrictive common notion of security we know. Our criteria also turn out necessary even with respect to very weak notions of security. Therefore we consider them valid for virtually all reasonable security notions. A remarkable corollary of our work is that every non-complete deterministic 2-party function with finite input and output alphabets is essentially symmetric. Thereby we extended the results of [Kus92, MPR09, KMQR09] to non-symmetric 2-party functions. The questions treated there become trivial for complete primitives and we have shown that every essentially non-symmetric 2-party function actually is complete.
However, our results are tightly bound to the case that the input alphabets are finte and of constant size. If the input alphabets are infinte or super-polynomially growing in the security parameter, there do exist counterexamples to our completeness criteria. E.g. in Figure 7 a 2-party function is depicted that has an OT-core (in the upper left corner) and is redundancy-free, but not complete. A corrupted Bob can completely go without ever inputting "0"; instead he can randomly use any other input symbol, what may be recognized by Alice only with negligible probability. As Bob thereby always learns Alices input, there cannot be any polynomial-time reduction of OT to this primitive. We consider it an interesting open problem to find combinatorial completeness criteria for 2-party functions with (super-polynomially) growing input domain.
Another interesting direction for future research would be expanding our results to 2-party functions that additionally use internal randomness. Some of our concepts, e.g. the notion of redundant input symbols and equivalent 2-party functions (cf. Section 2.2) or the concept of offline protocols and cheating situations (cf. Section 3.1.1 and Section 3.1.2), can be carried over to probabilistic 2-party functions rather straightforwardly. However, this does not hold for some crucial parts of our line of argument; e.g. apparently there is no way to generalize the " F "-relation (cf. Section 3.1.2) to the probabilistic case, as there inputting a redundant input symbol possibly can only be simulated by choosing randomly between several other input symbols. Therefore, also our method to find "robust" OT-cores (cf. Section 3.1.3) does not work for probabilistic 2-party functions in general.
